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About three-and-a-half million years ago, our early hominin ancestors began making stone tools, 
and in doing so, took the first steps on a long path of technical development and innovation. 
Kenneth Oakley (1957) even titled an influential article in Antiquity “Tools Makyth Man.” Some 
archaeologists take this belief a step further and aver that the development of stone tools marked 
a cognitive Rubicon, the crossing of which forever separated hominin mental life from that of our 
ape cousins (Hovers, 2012; Roche et al., 2009; Schick & Toth, 2006). They suggest that making 
and using stone tools required “planning,” “understanding” of conchoidal fracture, “complex 
thought,” and even “mental templates.” Others demur, suggesting instead that early lithic 
technology was instead very ape-like (Davidson & McGrew, 2005; Davidson & Noble, 1993; 
Gibson & Ingold, 1993; Hovers, 2012; Roche et al., 2009; Schick & Toth, 2006; Tennie et al., 
2017; Wynn et al., 2011; Wynn & McGrew, 1989). But, with few exceptions, the two perspectives 
appear to agree that hominin thinking occurred in the heads of the hominins, and that technical 
evolution reflected developments in brains and cognition. Put simply, bigger brains made better 
tools. Scant attention has been given to the idea that the tools themselves were a constitutive part 
of cognition, or that hominin thinking literally played out through their hands and tools. 
Contributors to this special issue of Adaptive Behavior have been seeking to explore this idea 
influenced by what is now known as the 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended; Gallagher, 
2017; Menary, 2010; Newen et al., 2018) approach to hominin cognition, believing it provides a 
more fruitful understanding of technical cognition than the typological and representational 
cognitive approaches that have dominated the past fifty years of paleoanthropology. 
 Like other African apes, early (pre 3.5 Ma) hominins ate a primarily vegetarian diet, which 
they augmented with insects and meat from small mammals. Indeed, a vegetarian diet had selected 
for their derived dentition of thick enamel and reduced canines. African habitats had been changing 
for several million years, with shrinking forests and woodlands and expanding grasslands that 
placed pressure on the hominin niche. Some groups of hominins added scavenging to their foraging 
repertoires. But they were ill-equipped to do so. Leaving aside the serious challenge of competing 
with carnivores, accessing edible portions of carcasses required slicing teeth and crushing jaws 
that these medium-sized vegetarians lacked. Luckily, African apes, including hominins, had long 
experience using tools to access hard-to-get food, including tools to break into encased foods 
(Parker & Gibson, 1979). In a sense, the hominin addition of scavenging was a lateral shift in tool 
use, from vegetable foods (including nuts and USOs) to carcasses. Pounding had long been a 
component of anthropoid tool use, including the use of stone hammers and stone anvils (Arroyo et 
al., 2016; Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Carvalho et al., 2008; Matsuzawa, 1994; 
Matsuzawa et al., 2014). When today’s chimpanzees pound nuts with stone hammers and anvils, 
mis-hits occasionally break off small pieces of stone. These pieces are sharp and potentially useful 
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as tools, but chimpanzees ignore them. After all, they retain respectable incisors and canines for 
cutting and slashing. Our 3.5-million-year-old ancestors did not ignore the sharp shards of stone. 
Instead, they used them as slicing tools, holding them with thumb and fingers and using them to 
cut through ligaments, tendons, and meat. The flaked hammers/anvils (“cores”) also made good 
crushing tools for accessing marrow from bone. 
 These three components—flakes, cores, and hammers—became the first lithic technical 
intelligence. The earliest hominin stone knappers used two techniques to fracture stone to produce 
flakes. In one, which archaeologists label direct free-hand percussion, the knapper held a target 
stone in one hand (the core) and struck it with a hammer stone held in the other, aiming the blow 
toward an edge of the core. If successful, the blow stripped off a thin shard of stone (a flake). Large 
flakes would have been a few centimeters in maximum dimension, large enough to hold between 
fingers and thumb and use to cut or saw. In the second “bipolar” technique, the knapper held the 
core on a stable substrate, such as a stone anvil, and struck the core with a hammer stone. This, 
too, resulted in sharp flakes appropriately sized for manipulation with fingers and thumb. Some 
types of stone are better than others, and hominins quickly learned to recognize varieties of stone 
that were easier to knap and yielded sharper, more durable flakes. Such raw material selectivity is 
well-documented in anthropoid tool use, so this too was a lateral shift in an established ability. 
 It is possible—indeed, even likely—that many groups of early hominins, even different 
species, experimented with using stone cores, hammers, and flakes. The technical knowledge may 
have emerged and disappeared on multiple occasions. Eventually, it came to be well established. 
But archaeological remains of such activity dating to the early time period between 3.3 and 2.0 
million years ago are rare. 
 Archaeologists have struggled with how to describe and characterize these remains. Since 
the beginning of academic archaeology in the nineteenth century, classification of artifacts has 
been an important analytical tool. This requires definition of types and sub-types, and labeling. 
Early on, the theoretical grounding of such classifications was rarely explicit; in the cases of stone 
tools, archaeologists relied on shape and presumed function (Shea, 2016). The first attempts at 
classifying stone tools made no attempt to incorporate anything linked to human psychology, 
whose study was at the time still in its infancy. The initial terminology developed by French and 
English archaeologists in the nineteenth century still governed the typologies of stone tools when 
archaeologists in Africa first encountered examples of extremely old artifacts. Louis Leakey, for 
example, used them as his basis for describing the very early stone tools he found at Olduvai Gorge 
in the 1930s, stratified below the first handaxes (Leakey, 1931). Mary Leakey used a modified 
version of these categories in her seminal 1971 volume that described the stone industries from 
Beds I and II (Leakey, 1971). She identified several categories of “core tools,” including side-
choppers, end-choppers, polyhedrons, and so on, and several categories of flake tools—scrapers, 
awls, and burins—all based on the shapes of the artifacts. 
 What can be confusing to non-archaeologists reading this literature is that archaeologists 
themselves were not strongly committed to the functional implications of the types. The labels 
were primarily a means of description and communication that all archaeologists knew. Prior to 
the 1970s, most archaeologists had little interest in hominin behavior; archaeology was a study of 
artifacts and how artifacts varied over time and space. This is not as sterile as it might seem, as 
recent publications by John Shea make very clear (Shea, 2011, 2013, 2016). However, in the 
1970s, the archaeology of early hominins took on a more self-aware theoretical approach that tried 
to place hominin agents and their tools into an ecological context, a movement pioneered by Glynn 
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Isaac (1977, 1984; Sept & Pilbeam, 2011). From this perspective, the tool types of the Leakeys 
were misleading. The hominins did not have categories in their heads such as chopper or flake 
scraper. Indeed, as Nick Toth brilliantly demonstrated (Toth, 1985), the hominins themselves were 
primarily interested in sharp flakes (aka light duty tools), and the occasional crushing tool (heavy 
duty), for which they often employed flaked cores. The important shift here, which the alert reader 
has no doubt detected, was from a focus on tools to a focus on hominin agents. Archaeologists 
were now interested in the hominins themselves, especially how they adapted using tools. Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, some of these scholars also developed an interest in hominin minds. 
 In 1969, paleoneurologist Ralph Holloway published an ultimately (but not initially) 
influential article in Current Anthropology in which he used stone tools as evidence for hominin 
linguistic ability (Holloway, 1969). He grounded his analysis in structuralist models of language, 
and linked standardization in stone tools (this was prior to the demise of Leakey’s typology) to 
rule-governed systems akin to language. Holloway’s analysis was firmly rooted in the prevailing 
anthropological thinking of the time, which was primarily structuralist in its understanding of 
culture, and Chomskian in its understanding of language. Both situate mental phenomena firmly 
inside the head. Tool use and technology were not major components of this anthropological 
account of human mindedness; most anthropologists gave tools little consideration. Computers 
were the exception. Along with the rapid development of computer hardware and software, a 
computer analogy for the mind quickly came to rival linguistic models. This understanding of mind 
as a linguistic/computational homunculus housed in the hominin brain became the default 
understanding of cognition for most paleoanthropologists. A decade later, three independent 
papers firmly established this model of mind as the preferred subject of cognitive archaeology 
(Gowlett, 1979; Parker & Gibson, 1979; Wynn, 1979). These archaeologists considered stone tools 
to be windows into prehistoric minds, not components of thinking itself. Assigning agency to 
hominins and using artifacts to document minds provided useful insights into the evolution of 
certain cognitive abilities, but it ignored the role that tools themselves played in early hominin 
cognition, and how that role influenced the evolution of cognition itself. Beyond this lacuna, the 
cognitivist model has other shortfalls, which 4E models of cognition have the potential to address. 
 Despite its popularity, cognitivism poses serious challenges for archaeologists. Even if we 
accept that internal representations in some form do exist and have some analytical value (e.g., in 
the study of language), they are unhelpful for cognitive archaeology. They are unhelpful because 
they imply that human thought can only take place inside the head, that this is where all 
computation takes place. What we see in the archaeological record can therefore only be an 
“external” product or the behavioral trace of those “internal” computational processes. Cognition, 
in other words, does not preserve in the archaeological record. Cognitive archaeologists can only 
infer cognitive processes by way of a sequence of linked inferences (Botha, 2010, 2016; Wynn, 
2009), and the more links in the chain, the greater the possibility of error. 
 The 4E approach to human cognition helps us to overcome this dualist representational logic, 
allowing us to engage directly with the archaeological record as an integral part of the thinking 
process, and thus ground a more parsimonious cognitive archaeology. It also treats stone tools, the 
primary vestiges of hominin thinking, as active participants in mental life. 4E approaches are a better 
grounding for understanding hominin technical expertise, a crucially important component of 
hominin cognitive evolution that has been underappreciated by the both the psychological and 
paleoanthropological communities (Osiurak et al., 2020; Osiurak & Reynaud, 2020). 
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 The 4E approach offers more than a parsimonious way of interpreting ancestral cognitive 
evolution from stone tools or appreciating our technological continuity with non-human primates: It 
offers a new way of understanding the nature of cognition itself. Here it must be emphasized that 
while we are undoubtedly concerned with human cognition, the role of tools within it is not unique 
to humans. Rather, tools are a constitutive part of the cognition of all tool-using species. Of particular 
interest, then, are the demonstrable differences between human tools and the tools of other species, 
as this has specific implications for hominin cognitive evolution. 4E cognition has the advantage of 
placing hominins and non-human primates on a level playing field. For reasons embedded in the 
early history of anthropology and evolutionary science, scholars and educated lay people commonly 
think of non-human primates, when they think of them at all, as pre-human. From this perspective, 
non-human primate behavior and tools stand in as proxies for hominin tool users prior to the advent 
of stone tools. The advent of effective hard hammer percussion indicates possible changes in 
hominin cognition, a flash of insight that delivered an understanding of conchoidal fracture. By 
eschewing a hominin homunculus, 4E cognition focuses on the tools themselves and the very evident 
continuity with the range of anthropoid tool use, including hominin tools use. 
 For human cognition, the 4E approach acknowledges that what the brain does is influenced 
by being in a body (embodied) that is located in a particular environment (embedded). These claims 
have become accepted to the point that they are now fairly commonplace. Still, the exact meaning 
of embodied cognition remains much contested (see Malafouris, 2016, 2017). The key point here, 
especially for the material engagement approach advocated by the contributors of this special issue, 
concerns the meaning of the term “in”: When we say that the brain is “in” the body or that the body 
is “in” the world, we mean that brains and bodies are situated—that is, they are entangled and 
intertwined with their surrounding environment. This is a very different formulation than that used 
when we say that the water is in the glass. As the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey observes 
defining the term of “situation”: “The meaning of the word ‘in’ is different from its meaning when 
it is said that pennies are ‘in’ a pocket or paint is ‘in’ a can….The conceptions of situation and of 
interaction are inseparable from each other” (Dewey, 1938, p. 43). 
 More contentious are the claims that cognition includes more than what the brain does, 
“leaking out” into the world to include not just the body but material forms (extended), and that 
cognition is the interaction between brain, body, and world (enacted). Perhaps one familiar and 
intuitive example of cognition that is extended and enacted is reading; a person cannot be said to 
read something without interacting with the material form known as writing. The cognitive state 
that is reading necessarily involves a material form. As Hutchins (2008) noted, “A good deal of 
contemporary thinking, and probably an even greater proportion of ancient thinking, happens in 
interaction of brain and body with the world. This seems innocent enough, and many people take 
it to mean simply that thinking is something that happens in the brain as a consequence of 
interaction with the world. That is not the claim being made here. The claim here is that, first and 
foremost, thinking is interactions of brain and body with the world. Those interactions are not 
evidence of, or reflections of, underlying thought processes. They are instead the thinking 
processes themselves” (p. 2112). 
 When cognition is modeled as something more than neural activity inside the brain, there 
is a range of theoretical perspectives and degrees of commitment: Besides embodied, embedded, 
extended, and enactive, cognition can also be described as situated or distributed, for example, and 
interpretations can be conservative and fairly well accepted or radical and reflective of broad 
disagreement. For this special issue on 4E cognition in the Lower Palaeolithic, the contributors 
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adopt theoretical frameworks like Material Engagement Theory (Malafouris, 2013, 2019) or 
constructs from ecological psychology like affordance (Gibson, 1977, 1979). 
 Material Engagement Theory, or MET, has three central commitments. First, cognition is 
extended and enacted. In arguing for this perspective, Malafouris does not merely assume that 
cognition is 4E; rather, he invites us to suspend disbelief, redraw the boundaries of cognition 
beyond the brain, and see what new insights might be generated. As was noted above, this 
perspective has particular advantages for the endeavor that is recreating ancient and ancestral ways 
of thinking from the material record. The second tenet is that materiality has agency. The argument 
here is that what we call “agency” is not a human property but the relational and emergent product 
of situated activity. There is no way that human agency (as capacity for action) and material agency 
(as the situational affordances for action) can be disentangled. MET’s third central element is 
enactive signification, the idea that meaning emerges from the interaction between organisms and 
material forms. Here the distinction is between hammer, a noun that means a tool designed and 
sold for a specific function, and hammer, the verb that means to pound one thing with another. 
Arguably, doing precedes the emergence of not just meaning (to hammer; a hammer) but also of 
form (what attributes of form make an object suitable for use as a hammer). 
 Affordances are relations between what a material form is and what an agent can do with 
it; thus, they are relations between an agent’s abilities and the exploitable features of its 
environment, rather than being properties of either: “The affordances of the environment are what 
it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). 
Gibson created the term affordance from the verb to afford, meaning by it “something that refers 
to both the environment and the animal” and implies their “complementarity” (p. 127). Malafouris 
(2013) identifies an affordance as a mechanism though which materiality exerts agency. Simply, 
affordances are properties of material forms that enable an agent to do something with them. Of 
course, the agent must also possess the behavioral, physiological, and/or psychological capacity to 
exploit the properties (Greeno, 1994; Scarantino, 2003). The corollary is that when a material form 
enables an agent to do something, its properties influence the results achieved and the concepts 
formed. Sextants and calculators—and, as will be argued by some of the contributors, stone tools—
show that affordances can also be encoded in artifacts, making them available for other individuals 
and generations, influencing behaviors and outcomes in subsequent performances and problem-
solving, and distributing cognitive effort over space and time (Hutchins, 1995; Smith, 2007). 
 In the special issue, the authors apply these and other 4E ideas to the question of cognition in 
the Lower Palaeolithic. The individual articles arose out of a series of workshops held at Keble College, 
University of Oxford, between February 2018 and November 2019. Several of the authors organize 
their essays around analyses of data, while others focus on theoretical and methodological issues. 
 Building on his Material Engagement Theory (2013), Lambros Malafouris sets out an 
ambitious reconfiguration of the meaning of cognition as employed by cognitive archaeologists, 
enabling a fundamental reassessment of how the mind of early hominins can be understood. His 
goal is to frame a more rigorous and productive cognitive archaeology that not only evaluates the 
hominin past but also contributes directly to how cognitive science understands the mind. His 
radical reconception of mindedness centers on the “ontological entanglement” of the mental with 
the physical. He does not deny a role for brains, but instead promotes extracranial resources to 
active participation. Rather than focusing on procedures or tool types with implicit normative 
implications—the traditional approach to understanding early stone tools—Malafouris focuses on 
cutting edges as material extensions of hominin action that restructured their mental engagement 
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with the material world. But Malafouris’ most provocative application is his discussion of the 
status of handaxes, a target of papers by several of the issue’s authors. Cognitive archaeologists 
have typically used handaxes, the first which appeared about 1.7 million years ago, to argue for 
imposition of form and the role of normativity (Shipton, 2019; Shipton & White, 2020). Malafouris 
turns this conceit on its head and lays out how hominin engagement with large cutting tools was 
instead the vehicle by which hominins began to construct elements of normativity, reiterating 
Overmann’s concern with the emergence of features as reflections of use and usability (in this 
special issue). This shift in understanding of mindedness provides an initial account of a mind 
unlike any encountered in the modern world. 
 Karenleigh A. Overmann proposes that the key difference that sets human cognition apart 
from that of all other species is the ability to leverage material forms for cognitive purposes, like 
accumulating and distributing cognitive effort between individuals and generations. She illustrates 
this cognitive purpose with writing in Mesopotamia, viewing it as a system that self-organized as 
script and literacy after some 15 centuries of incremental change in behaviors, brains, and material 
form. This self-organization intensified technological features that became maximized for use and 
usability through sustained, collective use of the tool. Overmann then applies these insights to the 
Lower Paleolithic, suggesting that stone tools also self-organized under conditions of sustained, 
collective use, a process in which emergent features reflected aspects of tool-use by particular 
species for specific purposes. She further speculates how and why such uses of material culture 
might emerge and intensify through processes like familiarity, an aspect of habituation, and their 
long-term effects on hominid cognition. 
 In her contribution, Anna Barona examines social perspectives on the evolution of the 
hominid brain, focusing on the Social Brain Hypothesis, which postulates a relation between the 
size of primate brains and social groups. Barona notes that such perspectives tend to reduce 
material culture to a mere product of and proxy for evolutionary cognitive change. This reduction 
excludes the possibility that material forms have an active role in cognition and its evolutionary 
trajectory. She recommends adopting the 4E approach toward an archaeology of the mind, 
positioning material artifacts as constitutive components of the ancient mind. Using Lower 
Paleolithic stoneknapping as an example, she applies Gibson’s concept of affordance as a relation 
between agentive capabilities and environmental properties, concluding that agency should be 
reframed as a phenomenon that emerges from situated action. 
 Hannah Mosley deploys Gibsonian affordances and Material Engagement Theory to 
examine the use of probes and hammers by Brazilian capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidnosus). In 
a refreshing counterpoint to the standard ecological accounts of non-human primate tool use, 
Mosley describes how local social and environmental contexts transform object affordances. From 
this perspective, she is able to explain site differences in capuchin tool use that have eluded 
explanation from the standard framework. Her account of non-human primate tool use provides a 
sound basis from which archaeologists can begin to explore the nature of affordances and artifact 
variability in early hominin lithic technology (e.g., Wynn’s use of coalescent affordances). 
 Christopher Baber and Klint Janulis use dynamic system theory and Gibsonian 
ecological psychology to investigate one of the purposeful behaviors performed by early 
hominins—the fracture of large mammal bones to access marrow. They frame purposeful behavior 
retrospectively as the end state of an actor-tool-environment system responding to achieve and 
maintain equilibrium. No prospective mental representation is required. In support of their stance, 
they provide preliminary results of an experimental investigation into the ergonomics and 
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biomechanics of bone cracking for marrow. Their account of the dynamic system is able to explain 
differences in basic tool features and identify optimal tool form for this particular task. The 
emphasis on ergonomics and purposive behavior ties in nicely with Wynn’s discussion of 
Oldowan core and flake technology, and Gowlett’s discussion of handaxes. 
 Thomas Wynn applies 4E concepts to the stone tools of early hominins, focusing on how 
affordances of stones and tasks, and ergonomic factors in their manipulation, could have been in 
impetus for the emergence of technical meta-cognition. He applies Gibsonian ecological psychology 
to view affordances as visual and haptic/motor features of objects on the landscape that are 
perceptually detected and structured by an agent’s biological capacities and capabilities. On this 
account, “tools” emerge internal representations but simply from using objects for specific purposes 
and recognizing properties that made them usable (similar to Overmann’s account). Ergonomic 
features like heft, balance, and edge would have emerged through flake removal, core manipulation, 
and tool manipulation, ultimately providing the basis for constructing an ontological category of 
“tool” as a “cluster” of co-occurrent features (similar to Gowlett’s account). Features that were not 
directly perceivable—“displaced,” “remote,” and “meta-” affordances—could then become 
exploitable through mechanisms like behavioral sustainment, habituation, reuse, and testing.  
 John Gowlett takes a more traditional stance in his discussion of the origin of aesthetic 
sense. He, too, focuses on the emergence of the handaxe 1.7 million years ago as an indicator of 
significant cognitive developments, including antecedents to modern aesthetic experience. 
Gowlett suggests that there is a deep structure governing the form of handaxes, much of it rooted 
in materiality and the ergonomics of tool manipulation (similar to Wynn’s account). But he also 
points to the “added value” that is apparent on many handaxes and uses this as an avenue to discuss 
the roles of social context, “appropriateness,” and levels of intentionality. 
 Rounding out the issue is the contribution of Frederick L. Coolidge, who tackles the 
knotty problem of the nature of neural contributions to 4E cognition. He focuses on the role of the 
cerebellum, a brain structure long associated with fine motor movement. Coolidge invokes the 
research of Masao Ito and Larry Vandervert, who have identified higher level cognitive functions 
based in the cerebellum that utilize its motoric organizational features to control other neural 
phenomena. Coolidge explores the implications of this model for understanding early stone tools 
and the evolution of creativity. 
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